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Abstract
The development of statistical methods for valid and efficient probabilistic in-
ference without prior distributions has a long history. Fisher’s fiducial inference is
perhaps the most famous of these attempts. We argue that, despite its seemingly
prior-free formulation, fiducial and its various extensions are not prior-free and,
therefore, do not meet the requirements for prior-free probabilistic inference. In
contrast, the inferential model (IM) framework is genuinely prior-free and is shown
to be a promising new method for generating both valid and efficient probabilistic
inference. With a brief introduction to the two fundamental principles, namely,
the validity and efficiency principles, the three-step construction of the basic IM
framework is discussed in the context of the validity principle. Efficient IM meth-
ods, based on conditioning and marginalization are illustrated with two benchmark
examples, namely, the bivariate normal with unknown correlation coefficient and
the Behrens–Fisher problem.
Keywords and phrases: Bayes; belief function; fiducial; inferential models; sta-
tistical principles.
1 Introduction
Statistical inference is the process of converting experience, in the form of observed data,
to knowledge about the underlying population in question, and is an essential part of the
scientific method of discovery. Our starting point in this paper will be a sampling model
for observable data X , depending on a parameter θ in Θ. Mathematically, a sampling
model for X is a θ-dependent probability distribution PX|θ defined on the sample space
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X of X . The sampling model’s dependence on θ implies that the observed data X = x
carries relevant information about the unknown parameter. Our goal is to convert this
information into a probabilistic measure of uncertainty. That is, for an assertion or
hypothesis A ⊆ Θ concerning the unknown parameter, we want to assign a measure of
the “plausibility” that the assertion A is true. This plausibility measure should depend
on the data x, should have a meaningful probabilistic interpretation, and should not
require specification of an a priori distribution for θ.
R. A. Fisher, starting with his work on inverse probability (Fisher 1930), made am-
bitious efforts to develop prior-free probabilistic inference based on a fiducial argument.
Fisher (1973, p. 54) writes:
By contrast [to the Bayesian argument], the fiducial argument uses the obser-
vations only to change the logical status of the parameter from one in which
nothing is known of it, and no probability statement about it can be made,
to the status of a random variable having a well-defined distribution.
Although some of the fiducial ideas were reinterpreted by Neyman (1941) and used to cre-
ate confidence intervals, a central concept in the frequentist paradigm, fiducial inference
has been perceived as Fisher’s “one great failure” (Zabell 1992). Fisher acknowledged his
only limited success in developing a framework for prior-free probabilistic inference based
on the fiducial argument, he insisted that there was something valuable in it. He wrote:
I don’t understand yet what fiducial probability does. We shall have to live
with it a long time before we know what it’s doing for us. But it should not
be ignored just because we don’t yet have a clear interpretation (Savage 1964,
p. 926).
Fisher’s confidence in the value of fiducial inference has inspired continued efforts, includ-
ing structural inference (Fraser 1968), Dempster–Shafer theory (Dempster 2008; Shafer
1976), generalized p-values and confidence intervals (Chiang 2001; Weerahandi 1993),
generalized fiducial (Hannig 2009, 2013; Hannig and Lee 2009), confidence distributions
(Xie and Singh 2013; Xie et al. 2011), and Bayesian inference with default, reference,
and/or data-dependent priors (Berger 2006; Berger et al. 2009; Fraser 2011; Fraser et al.
2010; Ghosh 2011). Here we will argue, however, that fiducial inference and its variants
mentioned above, are actually not prior-free.
Martin and Liu (2013) have recently introduced an alternative paradigm under the
name inferential models (IMs); see, also, the References and Further Reading below.
With the focus on logical reasoning with uncertainty, these authors seek the best possible
approach to genuinely prior-free probabilistic inference. The focus here is mainly on its
two fundamental principles, namely, the Validity and Efficiency Principles, and formal
approaches built upon these two principles. This includes basic IMs, conditional IMs for
combining information, and marginal IMs for efficient inference on interest parameters.
2 Difficulties in reasoning toward prior-free inference
2.1 Belief functions and models for total ignorance
To represent realistic knowledge about assertions of interest, the use of lower and upper
probabilities or belief and plausibility functions is necessary. Given data X , they are
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functions from the space of all subsets of Θ to [0, 1], denoted by
belX(A) and plX(A) = 1− belX(A
c), A ⊆ Θ,
where Ac = Θ\A stands for the negation of the assertion A. The belief function belX(A)
represents the amount of evidence in data X supporting the claim that the assertion
A is true. Thus, the value of belX(A
c) represents the amount of evidence in data X
supporting the claim that the assertion Ac is true or, equivalently, that the assertion A
is false. The plausibility function plX(A) represents the amount of evidence in data X
that does not support the claim that A is false. It follows that belX(A) ≤ plX(A) for all
assertions A. Also, unlike conventional probabilities, which are additive, belief functions
are sub-additive:
belX(A) + belX(A
c) ≤ 1, for all assertions A. (1)
For more discussion on belief functions, see Shafer (1976).
In terms of belief functions, a model of total ignorance can be formally written as
bel(A) = 0 and pl(A) = 1 for all A ⊆ Θ. (2)
That is, no evidence is available to either support or refute any assertion A. This defini-
tion is consistent with what is given in Fisher (1973, p. 36): “The necessary ignorance is
specified by our inability to discriminate any of the different sub-aggregates having differ-
ent frequency ratios, such as must always exists.” It follows immediately that probability
is not a satisfactory model for total ignorance and, therefore, no Bayesian priors can
represent total ignorance; see Walley (1991). In other words, all Bayesian priors are
informative, as the relative importance of any two points in Θ is fully specified. Never-
theless, Bayesian methods based on conventional probabilities (with proper or improper
priors) can be useful for constructing methods, e.g., confidence intervals, with good fre-
quentist properties (Fraser 2011).
2.2 Fiducial inference is not prior-free
There is a close connection between fiducial and default/“non-informative” prior Bayes,
so the limitations of the latter, discussed above, must also be limitations of the former.
To see this, suppose that there is a joint distribution for (X, θ) that is consistent with
both the sampling model (“X|θ”) and the fiducial distribution (“θ|X”). Then θ, or
some transformation thereof, must be a location parameter, and the fiducial distribution
corresponds to the Bayesian posterior obtained from a flat prior on the location parameter.
See Lindley (1958) and Taraldsen and Lindqvist (2013) for details.
To make these points clear, we take a closer look at the fiducial argument or, more
precisely, the fiducial operation in a simple example. Consider inference about the mean
of the unit normal model N(θ, 1) from a single observation X . A simple association for
this sampling model can be written as
X = θ + Z, Z ∼ N(0, 1).
In the fiducial literature, Z is called the pivotal quantity since its distribution is free
of parameters. When X is observed, the fiducial argument continues to regard Z, now
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written as Z = X − θ, as a N(0, 1)-distributed random variable. This distribution on Z,
and its functional connection to θ, admits a fiducial distribution for θ:
θ | X ∼ N(X, 1).
The “continue to regard” (Dempster 1963) reasoning is what drives the operation that
changes the knowledge status θ from total ignorance to that which can be represented by
conventional probability. This reasoning does not appear to be consistent with the goal of
prior-free inference. Indeed, the standard view that θ is fixed but unknown agrees with the
model of total ignorance. However, once X is fixed at its observed value x, the conditional
distribution of Z degenerates at the point x − θ. The fiducial operation that replaces
the degenerate conditional distribution Z ∼ δx−θ with the non-degenerate conditional
distribution Z ∼ N(0, 1) must be using some information beyond that contained in x and
PX|θ. Therefore, fiducial inference cannot be prior-free.
3 The IM framework
3.1 Background on the development
The precise formulation of the IM framework will be given below, but it may be of interest
to know how we reached this particular formulation since some might consider the journey
to be at least as important as the destination. The starting point was a precise statement
of the goal of statistical inference:
to give, for any assertion or hypothesis A about the parameter of interest,
meaningful summaries of the evidence in the observed data supporting the
claims that “A is true” and “Ac is true.”
Given these constraints, the goal is to make “the best possible inference.” This general
idea motivates the two principles given in the next section.
Towards this goal, a first question is if probability is the appropriate kind of measure.
In cases where a genuine prior distribution is available, the Bayesian approach based on
posterior probabilities is appropriate. However, when no meaningful prior information
is available, as is often the case in scientific applications, difficulties arise. First, as
discussed above, there is no prior distribution that encodes ignorance. Second, the use of
default or non-informative priors that depend on the sampling model differs enough from
the conventional Bayesian approach that, in our opinion, it cannot really be considered
Bayes. So, from a foundational point of view, we conclude that the Bayesian approach is
not appropriate for prior-free probabilistic inference.
The next question is if fiducial inference, or one of its variants, is appropriate. As
discussed above, fiducial has some difficulties. In fact, fiducial is basically Bayes with a
possibly data-dependent prior (Hannig 2013), so the same issues discussed above would
apply to fiducial. Dempster–Shafer theory was another candidate method, with the
appeal of not basing inference on probabilities but on belief functions. The difficulty with
the Dempster–Shafer approach, in our opinion, is that the corresponding belief function
values cannot be interpreted on a common scale. That is, in one application, 0.9 might
be a large belief function value, but in another it might be small. Having a common scale
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on which the belief function values can be interpreted—this is the “meaningfulness” part
of the above definition—is, in our opinion, essential the the success of a method as a tool
for scientific discovery.
So, after considering a variety of existing methods, Dempster–Shafer’s use of belief
functions was desirable, but a tool to properly calibrate the belief function values was
needed. The idea to expand the range between the belief and plausibility function values
with a random set calibrated to the distribution of unobservable auxiliary variable was
designed precisely to meet this need. This approach achieves what is set out in the
above definition; see, also, the Validity Principle below and (9). The goal then to do the
“best possible,” subject to the validity constraint, leads to the Efficiency Principle and
optimality considerations (Martin and Liu 2013).
Incidentally, though the IM belief function output is not a probability measure, we
consider IM inference to be “probabilistic” in a certain sense. The point is that it can
be explained through the prediction of an unobservable quantity with a random set, and
belief is just a probability with respect to the distribution of that random set. This is
discussed more in the following section.
3.2 Two fundamental principles and the basic IM framework
Philosophically, the IM framework for statistical inference is built on the following validity
principle (Martin and Liu 2014b).
Validity Principle. Probabilistic inference requires associating an unobservable but pre-
dictable quantity with the observable data and unknown parameter. Probabilities to be
used for inference are obtained by valid prediction of the predictable quantity.
To make the notion of “predictable quantity” precise, we consider an alternative
description of the sampling model. Specify an auxiliary variable U in U with distribution
PU and a function a such that the sample X , defined as
X = a(θ, U) where U ∼ PU , (3)
has distribution PX|θ. The pair (a, PU) is completely known.
Unlike fiducial and its extensions, for valid prediction, the IM approach carries out its
fundamental operations in the well-defined probability space of the auxiliary variable. The
key to this approach is the use of predictive random sets. According to Martin and Liu
(2013), a valid predictive random set S can be defined by specifying
(i) a collection S of nested subsets of U, including ∅ and U, to serve as the support of
S, and
(ii) the so-called natural measure PS for S that satisfies
PS(S ⊆ K) = sup
S∈S:S⊆K
PU(S), K ⊆ U. (4)
The centered random interval S[−|U |, |U |], where U ∼ N(0, 1), provides a simple example
of a valid predictive random set for predicting a realization from N(0, 1).
The IM framework makes probabilistic inference by propagating prediction in the
auxiliary variable space to the parameter space. The three-step construction is as follows.
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A–step. Associate the observable data X with the unknown quantity θ using an auxiliary
variable U ∼ PU , such as that in (3), to obtain the sets
Θx(u) = {θ : x = a(u, θ)} , x ∈ X, u ∈ U. (5)
P–step. Predict U using a valid predictive random set S.
C–step. Combine the association (5) and prediction S to get
Θx(S) =
⋃
u∈S
Θx(u). (6)
Then compute the belief and plausibility functions via the distribution of Θx(S):
belx(A;S) = PS{Θx(S) ⊆ A} (7)
plx(A;S) = PS{Θx(S) ∩A 6= ∅} (8)
If Θx(S) = ∅, then S needs to be stretched, i.e., replace S with the smallest S = SS in
S such that S ⊇ S and
⋃
u∈S Θx(u) is non-empty (Ermini Leaf and Liu 2012).
The IM results are probabilistic and, since the predictive random set is valid, the IM
results have desirable frequency properties (Martin and Liu 2013). In particular, if S is
valid, then for all A ⊆ Θ and all α ∈ (0, 1),
sup
θ 6∈A
PX|θ{belX(A;S) ≥ 1− α} ≤ α, and
sup
θ∈A
PX|θ{plX(A;S) ≤ α} ≤ α.
(9)
In other words, for example, plX(A;S) is stochastically no smaller than Unif(0, 1), as a
function of X , when the assertion A is true. This provides a meaningful and objective
scale on which to interpret the plausibility (and belief) function values. As a consequence,
one can obtain procedures, such as tests and confidence regions, having exact control on
frequentist error rates (Martin and Liu 2013).
Further developments concern efficiency, motivated by the following principle.
Efficiency Principle. Subject to the validity constraint, probabilistic inference should be
made as efficient as possible.
Martin and Liu (2014a,c) studied two classes of efficiency problems, namely, condi-
tional IMs for combining information and marginal IMs for inference on interest parame-
ters. These are introduced below with two benchmark examples, which help demonstrate
the differences between the IM and fiducial-type frameworks.
Finally, in some applications, prediction of future observations is the goal, not infer-
ence on θ. Prediction problems can be posed as ones involving marginalization or model
averaging. The IM framework is capable of handling such problems too, but this will not
be discussed any further here; see Martin and Lingham (2014) for details.
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3.3 Conditional IMs
Take the bivariate normal model with zero means, unit variances, and unknown corre-
lation coefficient θ. Consider inference about θ from a sample of size n, {(Y1,i, Y2,i) :
i = 1, ..., n}. The data-generating based association, for example, has a 2n-dimensional
auxiliary variable. Martin and Liu (2014a) argue that the fully observed functions of the
auxiliary variable do not need to be predicted and, by conditioning on the observed com-
ponents, the prediction of the unobserved components can be sharpened. This argument
implies that the association can be built from the model’s sufficient statistics
X1 =
1
2
n∑
i=1
(Y1,i + Y2,i)
2 and X2 =
1
2
n∑
i=1
(Y1,i − Y2,i)
2.
With independent chi-square auxiliary variables, U1 and U2, with n degrees of freedom,
the association becomes
X1 = (1 + θ)U1 and X2 = (1− θ)U2.
It is tempting to follow a fiducial-type argument and condition on X1/U1 +X2/U2 = 2,
an attractive parameter-free identity. However, such conditioning amounts to condition-
ing on all the data (X1, X2), which makes the predictive distribution degenerate and,
consequently, the corresponding inference is not valid for all assertions.
Note that the auxiliary variable is two-dimensional while the parameter of interest is
one-dimensional. To obtain an association with a lower-dimensional auxiliary variable,
Martin and Liu (2014a) propose to first rewrite the above association in terms of a new
pair of auxiliary variables (V1, V2) such that only V1, say, carries information directly
related to θ. By doing so, a conditional association obtains by taking V1 as the auxiliary
variable, with distribution conditioned on the observed value of V2. This leads to a
reduction of the auxiliary dimension from two to one. For the bivariate normal correlation
problem, their approach based on a partial differential equations gives the conditioning
function or component of the form
V2 ≡ (1 + θ) logU1 + (1− θ) logU2.
Note that the function above depends on θ; Martin and Liu (2014a) add the adjective “lo-
cal” in such cases. Inference can then be made by predicting a corresponding complement
transformation of (U1, U2), for example,
V1 ≡ lnU1 − lnU2.
Let Fθ denote the distribution function of V1 conditional on
V2 = (1 + θ) log
X1
1 + θ
+ (1− θ) log
X2
1− θ
.
The so-called local conditional IM can be represented using the basic IM with the auxiliary
variable W and the association
log
X1
X2
= log
1 + θ
1− θ
+ F−1θ (W ) W ∼ Unif(0, 1).
For more technical details, see Martin and Liu (2014a). The numerical results presented
there show that this local conditional IM produces exact confidence intervals that are
more efficient than the best of available frequentist methods.
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3.4 Marginal IMs
Suppose that θ is a multidimensional parameter, but that only some lower-dimensional
feature of θ is of interest. If θ itself were the parameter of interest, then we could find an
association to connect it to data and a set of auxiliary variables. However, in the case
where only a feature of θ is of interest, efficiency demands that we further reduce the
dimension of the auxiliary variable. The marginal IM approach of Martin and Liu (2014c)
presents a strategy for efficient, and often optimal inference on interest parameters. We
choose the benchmark Behrens–Fisher problem to illustrate MIMs and to contrast with
the fiducial approach.
Suppose we have two independent samples of size n1 and n2 from N(µ1, σ
2
1) and
N(µ2, σ
2
2), respectively, where all four normal parameters are unknown. The Behrens–
Fisher problem concerns marginal inference on the difference µ2 − µ1. The CIM theory
suggests that we start with an association based on the sampling distribution of the
sufficient statistics, i.e., sample means and variances X¯k and S
2
k , k = 1, 2. Let δ = µ2−µ1
be the parameter of interest. Take the following association, in terms of δ and the nuisance
parameters µ1, σ
2
1 and σ
2
2,
Y¯ ≡ X¯2 − X¯1 = δ +
(
σ21/n1 + σ
2
2/n2
)1/2
Z, (10)
X¯1 = µ1 + σ1n
−1/2
1 U, S
2
k = σ
2
kV
2
k k = 1, 2, (11)
where V1 and V2 are independent with V
2
k ∼ ChiSq(nk−1)/(nk−1) for k = 1, 2, (Z, U) is
bivariate normal with zero means, unit variances, and correlation coefficient depending
on σk’s and nk’s, and (V1, V2) and (Z, U) are independent. Fisher’s fiducial solution is
obtained by “continuing to regard” the auxiliary variable as having its sampling distri-
bution, conditional on the observed sufficient statistics. From the IM perspective, this
fiducial argument is questionable. It is also easy to check that this fiducial distribution
is the same as the Bayesian posterior distribution based on assigning flat priors to the
“location parameters” µ1, µ2, log σ
2
1 , and log σ
2
2.
Valid inference can be made with any admissible predictive random set for the four-
dimensional auxiliary variable (Z, U, V 21 , V
2
2 ). The shape of the predictive random set
controls the precision on features of the auxiliary variable. Due to the unknown µ1
in the first expression of (11), the accuracy in predicting U is not useful because it
provides no information on σ1 and, therefore, results in less efficient inference on δ in
(10). This suggests that we stretch the predictive random set along the U -coordinate
as much as possible, ending up with an effectively three-dimensional or marginalized
predictive random set for (Z, V 21 , V
2
2 ). This logical reasoning for efficient inference leads
to the initial dimension-reduced association:
Y¯ = δ +
(
σ21/n1 + σ
2
2/n2
)1/2
Z,
S2k = σ
2
kV
2
k k = 1, 2,
with the same (Z, V 21 , V
2
2 ). That same argument for the usefulness of accurate prediction
of σ21 for inferring δ leads to the further dimension-reduced association
Y¯ − δ√
S21/n1
= (1 + λ2)1/2
Z
V1
and
S22/n2
S21/n1
= λ2
V 22
V 21
(12)
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for inference about δ, with λ2 = (n1σ
2
2)/(n2σ
2
1) as the new nuisance parameter. Thus,
without loss of efficiency, we can make valid inference on δ by predicting a two-dimensional
auxiliary variable (Z/V1, V
2
2 /V
2
1 ). However, it does not appear that the same argument
can be used further to obtain an association for δ involving only a one-dimensional aux-
iliary variable.
To associate δ to a one-dimensional auxiliary variable, Martin and Liu (2014c) allows
the auxiliary variable to depend on nuisance parameters. Such a nuisance parameter-
dependent auxiliary variable is constructed in such a way that the effect of the nuisance
parameter on its distribution is minimized in some sense. A heuristic approach to con-
structing such a λ2-dependent auxiliary variable from (12) is as follows. For values of
V 22 /V
2
1 such that V
2
2 /V
2
1 ≈ 1, the value of 1 + λ
2V 22 /V
2
1 is approximately 1 + λ
2. This
suggests we divide the first identity of (12) by
(
1 + (S22/n2)/(S
2
1/n1)
)1/2
=
(
1 + λ2V 22 /V
2
1
)1/2
,
a variant of the second expression in (12). This gives
Y¯ − δ√
S2
1
n1
+
S2
2
n2
= Uω ≡
Z√
ωV 21 + (1− ω)V
2
2
, (13)
where ω = 1/(1 + λ2). Thus inference about δ can be made by a predictive random set
for the one-dimensional quantity Uω alone. Let Fω denote the distribution function of
Uω. We rewrite the above association as
Y¯ − δ√
S21/n1 + S
2
2/n2
= F−1ω (U), U ∼ Unif(0, 1). (14)
Introduce the predictive random set S = {u : |u − 0.5| ≤ |U ′ − 0.5|}, where U ′ ∼
Unif(0, 1), for U in (14). The corresponding predictive random set for Uω in (13) is
F−1ω (S) ≡ {F
−1
ω (u) : u ∈ S}.
To eliminate the effect of ω, take the enlarged predictive random set
S+ =
⋃
ω
F−1ω (S).
This predictive random set is valid for predicting Uω in (13), uniformly in ω and, therefore,
leads to valid inference on assertions about δ. It can be shown that S+ is equivalent to
the centered predictive random set for predicting a realization from the t-distribution
with min{n1 − 1, n2 − 1} degrees of freedom (Martin and Liu 2014c).
3.5 An example
Suppose that X1, . . . , Xn are iid N(µ, σ
2). Here, both µ and σ2 are unknown, but, for the
moment, the parameter of interest is ψ = µ/σ, the standardized mean, or signal-to-noise
ratio. We may first reduce to the joint minimal sufficient statistics (X¯, S2), the sample
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mean and sample variance, respectively. Based on this pair, the (conditional) association
can be written as
X¯ = µ+ σn−1/2U1, U1 ∼ N(0, 1),
S = σU2, (n− 1)U
2
2 ∼ ChiSq(n− 1),
where U1 and U2 are independent. The parameter of interest is a scalar but the auxiliary
variable (U1, U2) is two-dimensional, so we would like to further reduce the dimension of
the latter. Then the conditional association can be rewritten as
n1/2X¯
S
=
n1/2ψ + U1
U2
, and S = σU2.
The first expression has no dependence on σ. Also, for any pair (S, U2), there exists
a σ that satisfies the second expression. Therefore, in the language of Martin and Liu
(2014c), this is a “regular” association so the nuisance parameter σ can be eliminated by
ignoring the second expression above. That is, the marginal association is
n1/2X¯
S
=
n1/2ψ + U1
U2
.
The right-hand side of the above expression has a known distribution, namely, a non-
central Student-t distribution with n−1 degrees of freedom and non-centrality parameter
n1/2ψ. Therefore, a simple change of auxiliary variable gives the modified marginal
association:
n1/2X¯
S
= F−1n,ψ(W ), W ∼ Unif(0, 1),
where Fn,ψ is the above non-central Student-t distribution function. To this point, our
calculations agree with those of Dempster (1963) using fiducial arguments.
To complete the marginal IM for ψ, the A-step gives the sets
Ψx(w) = {ψ : Fn,ψ(tx) = w}, w ∈ (0, 1),
where tx = n
1/2x/s. For the P-step, we propose to use a simple “default” (Martin and Liu
2013) predictive random set:
S = {w ∈ (0, 1) : |w − 0.5| ≤ |W − 0.5|}, W ∼ Unif(0, 1).
This predictive random set satisfies the required properties for the corresponding IM to
be valid (Martin and Liu 2013). Finally, the C-step gives
Ψx(S) ≡
⋃
u∈S
Ψx(u) = {ψ : |Fn,ψ(tx)− 0.5| ≤ |W − 0.5|}.
Since the predictive random set is valid, one can produce valid probabilistic inference for
any assertion about ψ of interest. In particular, for singleton assertions, i.e., {ψ}, the
belief function is zero but the marginal plausibility function is
plx(ψ;S) = 1− |2Fn,ψ(tx)− 1|.
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Figure 1: Plots of the plausibility function for γ = σ/µ, the coefficient of variation, based
on samples of size n = 50 from N(µ, 1) for two values of µ.
We may construct an interval estimate for ψ using this marginal plausibility function.
Specifically, for some fixed level α ∈ (0, 1), the 100(1− α)% plausibility interval for ψ is
{ψ : plx(ψ;S) > α} which, in this case, simplifies to
{ψ : plx(ψ;S) > α} = {ψ : α/2 < Fn,ψ(tx) < 1− α/2}.
This plausibility interval clearly has frequentist coverage probability 1 − α, which is a
consequence of our general IM validity results.
As a variation on this example, next consider γ = 1/ψ = σ/µ, the coefficient of vari-
ation. Berger et al. (1999) demonstrate that this is a challenging problem for Bayesian,
likelihood, and frequentist frameworks. Using the approach just described for the signal-
to-noise ratio problem, it is straightforward to construct a marginal IM for γ. In partic-
ular, for singleton assertions, the plausibility function is
plx(γ;S) = 1− |2Fn,1/γ(tx)− 1|.
Plots of this plausibility function for two samples of size n = 50 from N(µ, 1), for two
values of µ, are displayed in Figure 3.5. Panel (a) shows the case of µ = 1, and it is
clear that the data are fairly informative about γ, and the true γ = 1 is contained in
the 95% plausibility interval. Panel (b) shows the case of µ = 0. In this case, data are
not particularly informative, i.e., the plausibility function does not seem to vanish as
γ → ±∞, so the plausibility regions are unbounded. Since we know the IM plausibility
regions are exact, it follows from the theorem of Gleser and Hwang (1987) that they must
be unbounded with positive probability. However, we argue that this is not a problem of
the IM approach. Given the usual variation of the sample mean around µ, if µ is (close
to) zero, then it is not possible to rule out γ values with very large magnitude. So, in
such cases, no reasonable approach should be able to rule out these extreme values of γ
based on data alone. Therefore, the marginal IM approach here arguably gives the “best
possible” inference on γ.
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4 Conclusion
Methods for prior-free probabilistic inference are fundamentally important for converting
experience to knowledge in scientific explorations. This is especially true in the “big
data” world we now live in. In spite of its failure as a general method leading to prior-
free probabilistic inference, Fisher’s fiducial arguments have inspired many statisticians to
think outside the box and to develop promising new approaches. For example, J. Hannig
and his coauthors have developed a generalized fiducial framework that yields inferential
methods which share the asymptotic efficiency of classical likelihood-based methods but
often perform significantly better in small-sample studies.
The IM framework is motivated by Fisher’s fiducial argument, but the two differ
both philosophically and technically. This new approach is promising in that it is truly
prior-free and produces posterior probabilistic assessments of uncertainty with desirable
frequency properties. This is really a new school of thought, with the ambitious goal to
carry out the best possible sampling model-based scientific inference, so the efforts so
far have focused on developing the fundamental ideas, building blocks of the framework.
Additional work can be found below in the References and Further Reading sections. As
discussed briefly here, the current work on conditional and marginal IMs shows that the
development of efficient IMs will be very interesting in years to come. While there is
still so much to do concerning theory, computation, and application of IMs, the authors
believe that it has a very bright future given the fundamental role that statistics has to
play in the development of science.
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